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Agency and Alienation 
1. David Velleman’s ‘problem of agency’, in his paper ‘What happens when 
someone acts?’, is the problem ‘of finding an agent at work amid the workings of 
the mind’ (1992, p.131). This problem arises when ‘a naturalistic conception of 
explanation’, implicit in the ‘standard causal story’ of action as belief-and-desire-
caused-behaviour, is adopted.1 In my opinion, the standard story, as it is 
standardly naturalistically understood, should be rejected. Rather than seeking 
an agent amidst the workings of the mind, we need to recognize an agent’s place 
in the world she inhabits. In order to do so we have to resist the naturalistic 
assumptions of the standard causal story. 
I use ‘naturalism’ and cognates here in Velleman’s sense, which is the sense 
of my opponents. (Thus ‘naturalism’ stands for a doctrine rejected by many 
authors in the present anthology, albeit that we may subscribe to a different 
doctrine at least as deserving of the name naturalism.) I single out Velleman’s 
1992 paper for criticism because Velleman is very explicit there about his 
naturalistic prejudices, so that it provides a clear example of a certain style of 
thinking.2 
2. There are various phenomena of human agency which we are apt to describe 
using the language of alienation, or of estrangement, or of non-participation. In 
Velleman’s account, the agents who are alienated are those who lack self-control, 
or self-understanding, or who undertake projects half-heartedly. There is the 
addict who injects heroin in spite of knowing that it would be better if she could 
resist doing so. There is the person who lacks motivation, because of depression 
or fatigue. And there is the agent who finds herself accounting for her behaviour 
by saying ‘It was my resentment speaking not I’. In all of these cases, Velleman 
thinks that we have belief-desire caused behaviour, and that the standard causal 
story applies. But the standard story is adequate to these cases, Velleman thinks, 
only because in these cases the relation between a human being and her action 
falls short of what is needed for a case of genuine agency. That is why Velleman 
tells us that we have to embellish the standard story to characterize what he calls 
agency par excellence: that we can only characterise the relation that obtains 
between a human being and her action in cases of non-alienated agency if we add 
something extra to the standard story’s states and events. But my idea is that 
Velleman’s problem of agency vanishes when the standard story is discarded. 
I want to discuss different kinds of alienated agency in what follows, in order 
to try to corroborate my opinion that the standard story should be rejected, not 
embellished. Besides the real phenomena that are describable using the language 
of alienation, there is alienation of a kind that I shall call ‘unthinkable’. We know 
------------- 
1  The ‘standard causal story’ of action is widely credited to Davidson. Certainly 
Davidson’s work has done a great deal to ensure that the thesis that explanation of what 
people do which proceeds by giving their reasons is causal explanation; and a certain 
understanding of this thesis gives rise to the standard story (see §6). But I think that 
Davidson’s claims of the mental’s irreducibility ought to discourage the picture of action 
that I criticise here (and that it would discourage it if a particular view of causality, also 
Davidsonian, weren’t in play). There is further elaboration of the standard story in §§5 
and 6. 
2  Velleman 2000 may not be such an obvious target for my remarks, as I acknowledge 
in an Afterword. Velleman is not alone in allowing his naturalistic thinking to lead to very 
implausible accounts of ourselves as agents. In my forthcoming, I pick on Michael 
Bratman. 
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that we are not alienated agents of the unthinkable kind, so that we can also 
know that we must resist whatever assumptions lead to our feeling that we might 
be so alienated, and that we must not assimilate the real phenomena of alienation 
to the unthinkable kind. I shall use a discussion of unthinkable alienation (§§3, 
4) to elicit the errors of the standard causal story of action (§6) and to show that 
Velleman’s problem is misconceived (§7). That will put me in a position to say how 
we might think about phenomena which interest Velleman and which we describe 
using the language of alienation (§8). 
3. When he endorsed the conception of explanation that gives rise to his 
problem of agency, Velleman cited Thomas Nagel. Nagel invited us to adopt a 
picture of the world in which all events and states of affairs are seen as caused 
either by other events and states or by nothing at all. If you try to imagine your 
actions as part of the flux of events in this picture, then you will find yourself 
alienated from them. As Nagel put it: 
Everything I do or that anyone else does is part of a larger course of 
events that no one “does” but that happens.’ (1986, p.113). 
It seems that in order to adopt the picture which Nagel invites us to, we have 
to view actions as set apart from the agents whose actions they are. But if actions 
are events—as Nagel assumed in presenting the picture, and as my naturalist 
opponents here all assume—then they are surely not events from which agents 
are set apart. The phenomenon of human agency can be caught in the first 
instance with the idea of someone’s doing something intentionally. When that idea 
is put together with acceptance of an event ontology, there is a way to define ‘an 
action’. Thus, one might say: there are human beings who do things; when 
someone’s doing something is her doing something or other intentionally, human 
agency is exemplified, and an event that is her doing the thing is an action. It is no 
wonder then that we should feel alienated if we are meant to think of our actions 
among the course of events and proceed to speculate about how we might fit in. 
For where an action has been picked out, an agent has been: the action is her 
doing something. (It isn’t true quite in general that an agent has been picked out 
whenever an action has been. One might for instance know that some human 
being had caused something without knowing who had. Such examples, however, 
do nothing to suggest that one ought to look for a human being within the flux of 
events present in the picture from Nagel’s external perspective.) 
Nagel encourages a sense of alienation by speaking as if you stood to an 
event that is your action in a relation expressible using the word ‘do’. This makes 
it seem as if you could participate as agent only by being related to something 
that might be present in a scene in which you yourself were not involved. It can 
then be tempting to think that in order to make a difference, you would have to 
butt in as a cause at the point at which your action is found. Hence, perhaps, 
some of the attractions of the claim that agents cause actions. But even if the 
idea of agents’ butting in might somehow help to give sense to the thought that 
agents contribute to what happens, there would still be a difficulty about 
supposing that the world to which agents make a difference is occupied only by 
events and states that are part of a flux in which agents themselves might never 
have been involved. For we take ourselves be influenced by, not only to act upon, 
the world to which our actions make a difference. In order to escape from a 
general threat that we are alienated from the world we inhabit as agents, we have 
to avoid thinking of ourselves as standing in a relation either of doing or of 
causing to the events that are our actions. 
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(It should be acknowledged that it is only in a semi-technical, philosophical 
usage that ‘action’ stands for events, and that it is not ordinarily so used. But it is 
only in this sense that actions are particulars and thus candidates to be ‘part of a 
larger course of events’. It adds to the general confusion in this area that ‘event’, 
as well as ‘action’, has uses in which it doesn’t stand for particulars. My policy 
here is to use both ‘action’ and ‘event’ as I think naturalists mean to—only for 
things in an ontology of particulars.) 
When the relation between agents and the events that are their actions is 
understood, it will not seem possible to locate actions among a causal flux in 
which agents might play no role. Human agents are not merely things within 
which things happen, and they clearly do play a role in the arena within which 
their actions are found. For an event of someone’s doing something is typically an 
event of her bringing something about; and the event that is her action (her doing 
the thing) brings about that which she brings about. A driver slams on her brakes 
and brings it about that the car comes to a sudden stop; the event that is her 
slamming on the brakes brings it about that the car come to a sudden stop. 
Nagel was surely right, then, to say that the very idea of agency is 
threatened when we try to accommodate actions in an ‘external perspective’. The 
role of agents in a world of events is evident only when it is appreciated that 
agents cause things—things that ensue from their actions. It seems unthinkable 
that agency should be manifest from any point of view from which it is impossible 
to locate agents. 
4. Nagel asked us to imagine looking at things from far away in order to pose 
his question about actions’ place in the natural world. One can produce the 
mystery also by looking at human beings close up and looking inwards—as Hume 
did. 
Hume expressed great bafflement about our role in the explanatory order 
when he looked at agents’ insides: 
We learn from anatomy that the immediate object of power in voluntary 
motion is not the member itself which is moved, but certain muscles 
and nerves and animal spirits, and, perhaps, something still more 
minute and more unknown, through which the motion is successively 
propagated ere it reach the member itself whose motion is the 
immediate object of volition. ... [T]he power by which this whole 
operation is performed, so far from being directly and fully known to an 
inward sentiment or consciousness, is to the last degree mysterious 
and unintelligible. How indeed can we be conscious of a power to move 
our limbs when we have no such power, but only that to move certain 
animal spirits which, though they produce at last the motion of our 
limbs, yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond our 
comprehension? (1748, §7, Pt I.) 
There are two things to notice about this passage. (Hume’s own agenda here are 
not to the present point.3) First, Hume’s proffered reason for denying that we are 
conscious of a power to move our limbs is that we do not have such a power. 
------------- 
3 At this stage in the Enquiry, Hume is in the process of arguing that we have no 
impression of causal power. He aims to refute someone who says that such an impression 
can be got from reflection on the influence of our volitions on bits of our bodies that we 
can move. 
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Secondly, Hume’s denial that we have a power to move our limbs does not (at 
least at this juncture) spring from any general mistrust of the idea of power; for 
he tells us straightaway that there is a power we have—a power to move certain 
animal spirits, whose excitations eventually produce motions of limbs. Hume’s is 
then a view of ourselves as agents from which we are bound to feel estranged. The 
only power we have is a power to produce effects, which are, as Hume says, 
‘totally different from’ the ones that we intend. Such effects—events in brains—
not only fail to be within the scope of our intentions, but seem not to belong to 
the world that we inhabit as agents. Agents, in a word, are alienated. 
One might want to blame Hume’s strange view on his ignorance of science, 
and one might want to blame it on his dualistic thinking. But I suggest that it has 
another source. If one looks inside someone’s skull, expecting to see the makings 
of intentional bodily movements there, one is sure to encounter a mystery about 
them. 
To see this, imagine someone called Jane who is given a very detailed 
account of electrochemical impulses, neural transmission, and so on, but an 
account that doesn’t mention any organism inside which this all takes place. 
Jane is told that, by knowing the scientific story, she knows everything that 
happens when someone moves his arm at will. She might reasonably be puzzled. 
Certainly knowledge of relevant portions of electrochemistry and understanding of 
the operation of neural transmission make her better placed than Hume was to 
know what goes on when someone moves: she can understand how a limb comes 
to move. But science doesn’t make her better placed than Hume was to say what 
someone’s intentionally moving his arm consists in. Hume’s mystery does not go 
away by providing a neuroscientific account of what goes on inside. 
Philosophers who are used to thinking that accounts at the sub-personal 
level record all the personal-level truths won’t allow that Jane’s predicament is 
anything like the one that Hume puts us in. They may say that Hume follows 
Descartes in separating mind from brain, and they may attribute his strange 
claims to this. But notice that there is actually no mention of a mind in Hume. 
Hume is hostile to substances, whether mental or physical; and he is happy to 
assume that volitions set the animal spirits in motion. His expressions of mystery 
and unintelligibility relate not to the operation of mind but to the production of 
motion by events in the brain and nervous system. Hume’s reason for thinking 
that our only power is to do things that we do not intend to do is that volitions, 
being at a distance from the limbs, are in no position to move the limbs directly. 
When causation is pictured, as it is by Hume, as proceeding always from event to 
event by relations of contiguity, the depths of the brain are the only place for the 
operation of a causal power antecedent to a limb movement. With that picture in 
place, the only question one can raise about causal history concerns how the 
limb gets to move. One loses sight of questions about the agent, and why she did 
what she did. 
If this diagnosis is correct, then the thing that explains Hume’s strange view 
is the absence of a human being from his account. There is nothing inside the 
skull—where causality, as Hume conceives it, is to be observed—which is in a 
position to move anything that it might have a reason to move: there is nothing 
for a predicate such as ‘moves the arm’ to apply to. Jane’s difficulties about 
locating actions in the scientific story have a similar source, then. Among the flux 
of internal events, she cannot find any event to identify with x’s doing something, 
where x is a human being. Presumably if Jane sought the advice of a present-day 
naturalist, she would be told that some tract of cerebral events adds up to an 
event of someone’s intentionally doing something. (Compare Velleman who writes: 
‘One is surely entitled to assume that there are mental states and events within 
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an agent whose causal interactions constitute his being influenced by a reason’ 
1994, p.124.) But we should wonder now whether Jane is not being asked to find 
an agent amid the workings of the brain by fabricating out of naturalistic 
elements something that can do duty for a Cartesian mind. Hume felt forced to 
deny that we have the power to move our arms. And so it seems should Jane—
unless she is allowed to take a different view in order to find human beings 
making movements of bits of their bodies. Until she does so, agents will seem to 
be alienated even from the bits of their bodies that they can move. It is 
unthinkable that this should be our situation. 
5. What is it for someone intentionally to raise her arm, if it is not, as Hume 
says, the operation of a power of hers to affect minute things inside her? 
Well, when someone raises her arm intentionally, there is (arguably4) an 
event of her trying to raise it, and an event of its rising. For some causal theorists 
of action, this will seem to be the beginning of an analysis. If it is agreed that both 
a trying-to condition and an arm-rising condition are necessary, the next idea will 
be that a causal condition—saying that x’s arm’s rising depends causally on x’s 
trying to raise it—supplies a third necessary condition of x’s raising her arm 
intentionally. And it might be suggested that these three conditions are jointly 
sufficient. But anyone who knows the history of this idea will be ready with 
counterexamples. Perhaps a neuroscientist intervenes between x’s trying to raise 
his arm and his arm’s going up, so that even though there is causal dependence 
of the latter on the former, it was the scientist rather than x who raised x’s arm (if 
anyone did). An analysis of ‘x raised his arm’ would need to include a condition 
that specified what it would be for a causal connection to be of the right kind. (It 
would need to find an informative way of excluding ‘internal deviant causal 
chains’.5) 
But if we resist the kind of alienation bred by Humean thinking, we shall be 
satisfied with something less than an analysis. The right kind of causal 
connection here, we can say, is the kind there is when someone’s arm’s going up 
is an exercise of her capacity to raise her arm at will. (The neuroscientist’s role in 
the counterexample is to pre-empt the exercise of such a capacity.) So we could 
say that someone raises her arm intentionally if and only if (i) she tries to raise it, 
and (ii) she therein exercises her capacity to raise it so that (iii) her arm rises 
because she tries to raise it. Possession of the relevant capacity is presupposed to 
------------- 
4 The claim that one tries to do what one intentionally does may be denied. But this 
claim introduces nothing that is especially likely to be rejected by those whose style of 
causal theory I dispute. Indeed the claim can be quite welcome to my opponents: making 
mention of an event of the agent’s trying to do something provides them with an item of a 
sort that may seem to them to be suited to belong among bodily movements’ causal 
antecedents as they conceive these. 
5 Mele aims to provide informative sufficient conditions for an event’s being an action in 
order to win an argument with an opponent who is an ‘anticausalist teleologist’ (see Mele 
2000). I think that Mele’s assumption that anyone who is opposed to ‘anticausalism’ must 
provide such conditions has prevented philosophers from seeing that there is a more 
modest causalism than that espoused by those who tell the standard story. (Mele persists 
with the standard causal story when he responds to Velleman 1992, in Mele forthcoming, 
Ch. 10. But Mele and I are in agreement (a) that there is no single state of mind 
corresponding to Velleman’s agency par excellence, and (b) that some of Velleman’s 
problems about locating agents go away when one acknowledges that an agent is a 
human being who acts.) 
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an agent’s trying to raise her arm. The capacity is not exercised by someone 
whose arm makes movements against her will—as in anarchic hand syndrome6; it 
is thwarted when someone is impeded in raising her arm; and it is destroyed if an 
arm is paralysed. We can only latch onto the facts about someone who 
intentionally raises her arm when we allow her to be capable of raising it. 
For all its circularity, this non-reductive account may be instructive. Of 
course its lack of analytical ambitions ensures that it cannot be of any help to 
anyone who had hoped to find naturalistically approved terms for describing the 
events that occur on an occasion when someone raises her arm intentionally. But 
it is genuinely a causal account, which reveals bodily agency as involving 
psychophysical capacities that depend on human beings’ causal complexity. It 
acknowledges, as Hume could not, that we have the power to move our arms. And 
it shows immediately that there is something wrong with the standard causal 
story of an action—as a belief-and-desire-caused piece of behaviour. 
6. The standard story has no dispute with my characterisation of an action as 
an event of someone’s doing something intentionally.7 And it can be agreed on all 
hands that a causal explanation of a certain sort can be given of why someone did 
something that she intentionally did. An explanation of the relevant sort shows 
that, in the circumstances the agent found herself or took herself to be, doing the 
thing was warranted or seemed to her to be. Those who are prepared to stretch 
the idea of ‘having a reason’ somewhat put this by saying that the agent had a 
reason to do the thing. And those who have a simplistic conception of a reason 
will then think of x’s having a reason for φ-ing as x’s having a desire which x 
thinks will be satisfied if she φ-s. 
So far, there need be nothing wrong with this story, beyond its 
overgeneralizing the role of reasons and of desires. But it is from this story that 
naturalists reach ‘the standard causal story’. They do so by converting the claim 
that x’s φ-ing is explained by her having a desire which she thinks will be 
satisfied if she φ-s into the claim that belief-desire pairs cause bodily movements. 
The conversion takes place by way of three transitions. First, x’s desiring 
something and believing something is translated into talk of items with causal 
potential, so that x’s having a reason is taken to be a matter of the existence of a 
pair of states.8 Secondly, the fact that these states are cited in a causal 
explanation of why x did what she did is taken to be equivalent to their being 
causes of an action. And thirdly, an action is thought of as something on the 
physical side of a supposed mental/physical divide and called a bodily movement. 
------------- 
6  Anarchic hand syndrome is a rare condition, owed to injuries to the motor area of the 
brain and corpus callosum, from which Dr. Strangelove (the Peter Sellers’ character in the 
Kubrick film of that name) suffered. 
7 My way of telling the story assumes that Davidson is right about actions’ 
individuation. There are naturalists who think that Davidson is wrong about that. My 
claims would need to be recast to count against them. 
8 Of course there is a use of ‘state’ such that a person’s desiring something or believing 
something (not to mention having a capacity to move her arm) is a state of hers. But in 
this use of ‘state’, states don’t belong in a category of particulars which includes events—
or, as Velleman says, ‘occurrences, the basic elements of explanation in general .. in 
terms of which any explanation of human action will speak (1992, p.130). Steward 1997 
contains very effective criticism both of the way that ‘state’ has come to be used in 
philosophy of mind, and of the model of causality that is brought to the subject with a 
‘naturalistic conception of explanation’ such as Velleman’s. 
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The central claim of the standard story of action, then, in its most familiar 
version, is that belief-desire pairs cause bodily movements. When ‘try to’ is 
introduced, the claim may be that a “belief-desire pair” causes “a trying”, which 
causes a movement in its turn.9 
There is no need to look at further details to see that the story creates the 
problem which Velleman called the problem of agency. In relying on the idea of 
items linked in a causal chain, the standard story treats causation as Hume did, 
and takes it to be possible to find an action without locating any bodily being who 
can move. We cannot then see any agent making any difference to anything: we 
have the problem ‘of finding an agent at work amid the workings of the mind’. 
7. Velleman saw no difficulties about bodily agency when he posed his problem 
of agency. That problem is supposed to arise specifically in cases where the agent 
does not suffer from being or feeling alienated, whereas there is bodily agency—of 
which Hume gives such a strange account—whether or not the agent is alienated. 
The standard causal story is fine with Velleman so long as it is told about agents 
who are depressed or fatigued, or who lack control, or would prefer to be 
motivated differently from how they actually are. 
Inasmuch as Velleman’s own problem of agency is restricted to what he calls 
agency par excellence, Velleman must think that the picture got from Nagel’s 
external perspective, from which human beings are absent, succeeds in 
containing the truth about agency at least some of the time. But one wonders 
then how Velleman can think that Nagel’s external perspective reveals ‘the 
obstacle to reconciling our conception of agency with the possible realities [given 
our] scientific view of the world’ (p.129). For as Nagel saw things, there appears to 
be no room at all for agents in the naturalistic explanatory order. 
Well, part of the explanation of Velleman’s belief that the standard story 
sometimes has application is his thinking that there is agent participation of a 
sort wherever there is human action. He says that ‘every action must be … such 
than an agent participates in it, in the sense that he does it’ (n.5, p.128). Here he 
relies upon assuming that we encounter a trouble-free kind of agency as soon as 
we can say ‘He does it’. But in making this assumption, Velleman refuses to face 
up to the threat of unthinkable alienation. Nagel said that his external 
perspective presented a general threat to “he does it” being true in any sense; and 
we saw that this seems exactly right if we construe ‘he did it’ as expressing a 
relation between a person and an event in the naturalistic explanatory order (cp. 
§3). It is true that we also saw that ‘He did it’ is not actually understood in this 
way, and that Nagel’s threat is engendered by a misunderstanding about how 
people relate to the events that are actions. But the present point is that 
Velleman cannot consistently hold both that Nagel’s external perspective poses 
some genuine threat to our agency, and that someone’s action is 
unproblematically accommodated in the naturalistic explanatory order by virtue 
of his having “done it”. 
In fact Velleman appears to acknowledge that there is a more general 
problem than the one he labels the ‘problem of agency’. For he tells us that the 
mind-body problem is that of ‘finding a mind at work amid the workings of the 
------------- 
9 My own claim has been that a bit of a person’s body’s moving may be causally 
dependent on her trying to do something. With the notion of ‘trying to’ introduced, then, it 
can be all right to speak of ‘bodily movements’. But this is not to say that it is all right to 
speak of actions themselves as bodily movements—to speak as if a person’s doing 
something were a bit of her body’s moving. 
8 
 
 
 
body’ (p.131). And if we are to think of ‘a mind’ as something that may move the 
body, then the phenomenon of bodily agency presents us with the mind-body 
problem as Velleman thinks of it and as we encounter it so vividly in Hume. 
(Notice that given this account of the mind-body problem, the problem Velleman 
labels the problem of agency is a problem about locating something amid the 
workings of something which has a problematic location amid the workings of the 
body.) 
However exactly Velleman arrives at his view of the extent of the problem 
that he labels the ‘problem of agency’, he proposes to solve it by introducing a 
particular mental state, not usually admitted by the standard story’s advocates, 
among actions’ causal antecedents. The state in question is one that ‘plays the 
functional role of an agent’, and Velleman postulates that such a state is 
operative when there is ‘agency par excellence’. But we can see now that this 
proposal is not addressed to the standard story’s real difficulties. If human 
actions cannot be located among states and events viewed as part of ‘the flux of 
events in nature’, then introducing another state into that same flux could never 
be a recipe for bringing them in. A state supposedly playing the functional role of 
an agent brings too little too late. Such a state is literally too little, because full-
sized human beings, not merely the putative inhabitants of their minds, are 
agents. Such a state arrives on the scene too late, because, as we shall see, 
human beings are thoroughly involved not only in their actions but also in their 
actions’ causal pasts. 
8. Velleman thinks that an agent’s feeling or being alienated from what she 
does is a matter of the relation between her and her action falling short of what is 
required for a case of real agency, or of ‘agency par excellence’. But if, as I have 
argued, the agent-action relation is simply that between a and a’s doing 
something, then it is impossible to make literal sense of this. And if, as I have 
argued, human beings are actually ineliminable from an account of their agency, 
then someone who fails to exhibit agency par excellence cannot be treated as 
someone in whom some functional role state fails to do its bit. Evidently we need 
to think differently from Velleman in order to draw distinctions between alienated, 
non-full-blooded agency and agency par excellence. But we shall discover that we 
naturally think differently: it is only to those in the grip of the naturalistic 
conception of what happens when someone acts that it could seem that 
differences between actions had always to be recorded as differences between 
causally efficacious items that produced them. 
The agents for whom Velleman thinks the standard story is adequate are (as 
we saw) people who lack self-control, or self-understanding, or who fail to act 
wholeheartedly. In these cases explanations may appeal (respectively) to the 
strength of the agent’s desires, to the impotence of her reasons, and to the force 
of an emotional reaction that she herself has not fully acknowledged. But in none 
of these cases should we succumb to thinking of states and events which are 
items inside her and which cause her body’s movements. When someone’s 
springs of action are ones she would prefer be rid of, it is understandable that we 
should liken them to constraints, and it is true that the language of forces and 
inertia then comes very naturally. But a person who appreciates that her conduct 
is out of accord with what she values, or is swayed by factors whose influence she 
regrets, admits her own motivations even if she does not approve of them. The 
desires and emotional states which explain what she does are after all states of 
hers—of the human being whose capacities to make movements are exercised—
and, even where she feels alienated from them, they are not adventitious forces in 
her brain. (To think of adventitious forces in the brain seems more appropriate in 
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understanding, say, the involuntary movements of sufferers from anarchic hand 
syndrome, which lack any personal psychological explanation.) 
Of course we must allow that an agent can be, or feel, more or less 
alienated. To allow for this, we might think of agency as coming in degrees. There 
is a range of properties possessed by agents which they may exhibit more or fewer 
of on occasion, and to a greater or lesser extent. Our conception of an agent-in-
the-highest-degree might be a conception of someone who is fully self-reflective 
and has complete self-control, who has values and makes valuational judgements 
upon which she acts, who uses reason and argument effectively, who is sensitive 
to her circumstances, who puts her heart into what she does, and who, as we 
say, identifies with her motivations and with what she does.10 To the extent to 
which a person’s doing something on an occasion shows her as deficient 
compared to an agent-in-the-highest-degree, we could think of her as failing to 
participate in Velleman’s agency par excellence. This is now to think of her as 
falling short of some ideal or other, and not as lacking some causally potent brain 
state. 
A particular division among agents’ properties will be important in 
considering what might be demanded of an agent in the highest degree. For we 
want to distinguish between the agency of mere animals, the regulation of whose 
lives follow biological patterns, and the agency of self-determined, human beings. 
In the animal case, drives, instincts and desires of certain sorts loom large in the 
aetiology of behaviour. In the human case, the influence of reason is 
characteristic. Yet even where the agent is a human being, what is done 
sometimes fails to be caught up with the appropriate functioning of a reasonable 
being and is then explicable in a more or less animal mode. Acting out of an 
addiction would be a case in point. We can understand why someone who has the 
capacities of a human agent may feel distanced from what is thus explicable, and 
why one should think that her agency then is less than full-blooded agency. But 
this is not to follow Velleman in thinking that the standard story can be told. For 
we still have an agent, something she does, and a psychological account of that. 
Velleman sometimes writes as if his problem of agency were a problem about 
setting human action apart from the rest of animal behaviour. ‘What makes us 
agents’, he says, ‘—in our conception of ourselves, at least, if not in reality—is our 
perceived capacity to interpose ourselves into the course of events in such a way 
that the behavioural outcome is traceable directly to us’ (p.128). Provided that 
‘interposing ourselves’ is understood here as a matter of exercising our 
distinctively human capacities, and standing as we do to the events that are our 
actions, this seems exactly right (cp. end of §3). But in that case Velleman’s 
qualification ‘if not in reality’ is surely needless. And there can be no need to deny 
that animals too can exercise their (animal) capacities (although the events of 
their exercising them are evidently not human actions).11 
------------- 
10 The idea that an agent can be more or as less fully identified with what she does is one 
of the things that leads to Velleman’s talk of the agent/action relation as coming in 
degrees. The language of identification crops up sometimes in the personal identity 
literature, and there it sometimes leads, as it sometimes does in the present case, to an 
unwarranted reductionism. 
11 The picture from Nagel’s external perspective in which only events and states are 
visible extrudes non-human animals along with human beings. For something about how 
human beings may be accommodated into a different picture as, as it were, a special sort 
of animal, see McDowell 1994, pp.114–119, and M. McGinn 2000, esp. pp.309–315. 
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Philosophers are interested in human beings. And they are interested 
inevitably in defects of agency—whether lack of self-control, weakness of will, 
failures of self-understanding or features that impugn responsibility. This interest 
encourages one to forget about the mundane and habitual. When someone, say, 
puts on her coat, leaves the office, and buys the evening newspaper before getting 
on the ’bus which will take her home, she does not express any deeply held 
values, or deliberate very much, or display particular self-knowledge or self-
control. But nor is her agency defective: there are straightforward explanations of 
what she does, and even if these allude only to mental states of kinds recognised 
in the standard story, we feel no pressure to add an extra ingredient in order to 
reveal her as a more or less reasonable, conscious being. Velleman leaves out the 
relatively mundane when he contrasts various kinds of defective, alienated agency 
with agency par excellence. The omission presumably stems from his thinking 
that the standard causal story needs some special supplementation if it is to 
contain a genuine agent. But when human beings themselves are an 
acknowledged part of the subject matter in explanations of things they do, there 
ought to be no pressure to add special states of mind, beyond those that are 
ordinarily recognised, to ordinary explanations. We can then understand why, in 
unremarkable cases, a person does not have to exhibit any of the properties that 
one might associate with ‘agency par excellence’. And we shall find no reason to 
think, as Velleman does, that there has to be some single line to be drawn 
between defective agency and the real thing—some one state that makes human 
beings the sorts of agents that they are. It would actually be very remarkable if 
someone could exhibit all of the properties of an agent-in-the-highest-degree [all 
at once, as it were]—which is what a case of agency par excellence seems to 
demand. 
One can understand Velleman’s special interest in agency par excellence. 
For we certainly don’t wish everything we do to be the product of desires we share 
with non-human animals, or to be a matter of habit or routine. But inasmuch as 
we do aspire to participate in agency par excellence, that need not be because we 
hope that some particular mental state should be operative in us as often as 
possible, but because we hope that we have all those standing capacities that we 
associate with agency in the highest degree. The extent to which we should wish 
actually to exercise such capacities obviously depends upon the kind of conduct 
that might be called for from us on occasion. An account of agency par excellence, 
then, can be focused on what should be contained in a description of a human 
being ideally equipped for life’s contingencies. There is no need to think of it as an 
account of a particular sort of psychological machinery at work on each and every 
occasion of action when the agent is not alienated. 
9. There are faults in the standard causal story (as I sketched it in §6) of a sort 
that I have not spoken to here. Nearly everyone would agree that an adequate 
account of human motivation would include mental states of many more kinds 
than the standard story recognises, and that it is the product of 
overgeneralization. It is widely accepted, for instance, that people’s having 
intentions and plans cannot be reduced to their having reasons.12 And not only 
(as I suggested above) does the notion of ‘a reason’ have to be stretched if human 
agency is always to conform to the standard story, but it is also true and widely 
------------- 
12 Michael Bratman argued this, and demonstrated the shortage in the kinds of mental 
state that the standard story trades in, in his 1987. 
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acknowledged (and it leads to an opposite sort of distortion) that with its casting 
of desire as a ubiquitous motivational ingredient in the genesis of action, the 
standard story obliterates distinctively rational and deliberational influences on 
an agent’s conduct. Sticking with the standard story’s conceptual resources then 
has the consequence that someone who acts always out of non-reasoned desires 
can be a paradigm of a human agent. This could provide another part of the 
explanation why Velleman takes the story to be adequate to telling us what 
happens when someone acts in some defective way, but to have peculiar 
difficulties when it comes to agency that is distinctively human or especially full-
blooded. 
But once it is allowed that full-blooded human beings are the topic of an 
account of human agency, the project of providing an account will not seem to be 
that of adding further pieces of psychological machinery to states of belief and 
desire. An account of human agency that is allowed to be a part of an account of 
human beings can speak of states of mind from a broad range—virtuous or 
vicious traits of character, dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional 
reaction, personal loyalties, and commitments that derive from people’s various 
individual projects.13 It is easy to avoid the distortions that the standard story 
introduces with its supposition that everything we can know about our nature as 
practical beings is to be incorporated in a psychological theory that speaks of our 
inner workings. 
10. Let me try to sum up, and reach the main conclusions. 
I have claimed that there is alienation of an unthinkable sort when an agent 
is portrayed as if she were merely an arena for events. And I have also claimed 
that the project of looking for an agent amid the workings of a mind could never 
assist in getting rid of such alienation. No-one ever does anything in Nagel’s 
picture, and it could hardly make any difference to this which particular kinds of 
states and events are supposed to be present from the external perspective. From 
that perspective, the events which are actions are missing, and they cannot be 
introduced by postulating a special kind of cause for them. 
I suggested that there is something peculiar about thinking that the 
standard story of agency encounters a particular problem in cases of non-
defective agency. How could it be that the story is fine so long as it is told about 
agents who are depressed or fatigued, or who lack control or self-determination, 
or who would prefer to be motivated differently from how they actually are? Our 
understanding of such agents relies upon our knowing that they lack some 
capacity, or are unable to, or fail to, exercise some capacity. But then we 
understand them as beings who might have possessed, or have exercised, the 
relevant capacities; and their status as human agents is presupposed to their 
conduct’s being explicable as it is. Someone who falls short of displaying the 
properties of the paragon agent on some occasion is not treated as if they were 
then simply the locus of series of mere happenings. 
------------- 
13 I quote more or less from Bernard Williams’s description of the ingredients in a 
person’s ‘motivational set’ in his 1981. Williams 1987 is a good antidote for those who are 
apt to think that there is some one, significant line to be drawn between agency that is 
genuine/full-blooded/par excellence and agency of a defective sort. But beware: Williams 
means something different both by ‘naturalism’ and by ‘action’ from what I use these to 
mean for the purposes of the present paper: (see §1 and parenthetic paragraph in §3 
above). 
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If one ignores the gross physical facts of bodily agency, then it will be 
relatively easy to suppose that an agent’s participation requires nothing that is 
obviously missing from the standard story of states and events as causes. But it 
becomes clear that Velleman’s problem of agency would be a general problem (if it 
were a genuine problem at all) when one considers bodily agency, and encounters 
the species of unthinkable alienation introduced by Hume. 
Velleman himself puts his problem of agency in a quite general way at one 
point: he says that it is difficult to know ‘how the existence and relations of .. 
mental states and events .., connected to one another and to external behaviour 
by robust causal relations, .. can amount to a person’s causing something rather 
than merely to something’s happening in him’. To this the answer now is simple: 
‘They cannot’. No compounding of states and events in the naturalistic picture 
from which human beings are absent could constitute someone’s doing 
something that she intentionally does.14 
Velleman assumes that only mental states feature in the causation of 
actions, and he treats states as things to be lumped together with events in a 
single ontological category of ‘items’ or ‘occurrences’ (p.130). The assumption 
might seem to be recommended and the treatment necessary if the causal 
dependencies recognised when people do things had to be discernible among the 
causal chains that constitute the world’s naturalistic workings. But the real 
causal dependencies are not discernible there. Nor can they be introduced by 
superadding a surrogate for a human being on top of—or (more literally, as 
Velleman sees things) in the middle of—the standard causal story. 
 
 
AFTERWORD ON VELLEMAN.  In his ‘Introduction’ to The Possibility of Practical 
Reason (Oxford University Press, 2000), Velleman no longer wants to draw exactly the 
line that he aimed at in the 1992 paper discussed above. And Velleman no longer 
speaks directly to the question whether states of agents’ minds which are introduced 
to characterize different kinds of agency must belong within an account that 
subscribes to only a naturalistic conception of explanation. But some of my criticisms 
still apply, I think. In the ‘Introduction’, Velleman retains the idea that there is some 
one property of agents that we must uncover to characterise autonomous action. And 
he carries on with the idea of ‘adding to the standard model’ (pp.10–12). His thoughts 
about ‘a mechanism modifying the motivational forces [already] at work’ in a creature 
not endowed with practical reason also show him as captive still to the conception 
under attack in the present paper, I think. 
 The distinction that Velleman wants to capture in the ‘Introduction’ is between 
autonomous action and mere activity (as opposed to the 1992 distinction between 
agency par excellence and something relatively defective). Mere activities include so-
called sub-intentional cases (along with the cases of defective agency of concern in 
1992). This means that the category within which the new distinction is to be made is 
not the category of actions as I have characterised these here, using ‘intentionally’. 
Still, the crucial line on which I should insist is that between cases where the agent 
belongs in the story and cases where she does not. Thus I would agree with Velleman 
that one could find fault with the standard story for its assumption that the only 
------------- 
14 There is much more to be said against the psychological reductionism to which 
Velleman thinks we are obviously entitled: see e.g. Dupré 1993, esp. Chs. 4 and 7. For 
those who have joined the naturalists in their habits of thought, it might help to point out 
that even when one contends that there are facts which are not part of the world defined 
by their naturalism, plenty of materialist intuitions can be retained: see e.g. Haugeland 
1984. 
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important line to be drawn comes between actions (as characterised here) and other 
events. (This doesn’t come to the surface in the present paper, but it will have 
repercussions for how one thinks of the ‘personal level’ of explanation.) 
 Velleman has been a suitable person for me to single out for criticism because a 
naturalistic metaphysics informs his work even though the questions he addresses 
are not stock questions in theory of action. Certainly his work on agency in the last 
decade (see papers in 2000 collection and subsequent papers) contains much which 
is of immense interest and which can be disentangled from the naturalistic thinking 
that I have criticized here. 
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